NEC Electronics

  • Reference: HBS-209001-E

  • Year: 2007

  • Number of pages: 17

  • Geographic Setting: Japan

  • Publication Date: Oct 22, 2008

  • Fecha de edición: Nov 3, 2010

  • Source: HBSP (USA)

  • Type of Document: Case

  • Industry Setting: Hedge funds

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Description

Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mispricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation.

Keywords

Corporate governance Equity capital Investments Private equity Restructuring Return on investment Shareholder relations Stockholders